I
COMING TO TERMS WITH
DEFINITIONS
‘Culture’ and ‘schizophrenia’ share much:
they are both poorly defined, highly reified and
sloppily used concepts within and without their
professional applications. The acceptance of these
reifications produces the mirage of drawing clear
boundaries where only arbitrary distinctions
exist. One such boundary can be seen in the
contrast between the individual phenomenon
(schizophrenia) and the aggregate phenomenon
(culture) and the relationship generally posited
when the two are mentioned together. Such a
relationship is illustrated by both Lidz (Lidz
1963; Lidz, Fleck and Cornelison 1965) and Bateson
(Bateson, Jackson, Baley and Weakland 1972;
Bateson 1972) who typify two of the more prominent
approaches to the psychosocial input into
schizophrenia.1
They use what might be considered as modified
forms of Harry Stack Sullivan's well-known
interpersonal theory.
Theodore
Lidz focuses on a deprivation in the interpersonal
environment which is generally manifested in the
family. The family is seen as a kind of local
expression of culture charged with imparting the
values of the larger system. Consequently, the
culture, mediated by its sub-unit, the family, is
seen as the seminal source of this deprivation.
Lidz's
portrayal of the context of the schizophrenic
situation recasts the unit of consideration from
the individual to the family. Lidz extends his
argument (1963: 13ff) by positing the
deterioration of the family as symptomatic of
rapid cultural change and this culture change is
equated with a response to traumatic culture
contact. However, he begs several questions which
typify deficiencies often encountered in theories
of schizophrenia. First, he does not account for
those cases which do not conform to his sample of
interesting but rather bizarre families. Second,
he fails to account for 'normal' development
within such circumstances. A third problem, which
I will emphasize in a later discussion, is the
behavioral isomorphism that exists between
schizophrenia and various known reactive syndromes
(e.g., drug toxicity, trypanosomiasis). Fourth,
Lidz does not account for between-culture
variations in manifest symptomatology or for the
existence of the syndrome in cultures not in the
throes of rapid culture change.
In a
somewhat simplified depiction, Gregory Bateson’s
double bind is based on “the hypothesis that
schizophrenia is learned and becomes habitual”
(Bateson 1972: 245). He further proposed that “to
get confused about logical type, one presumably
has to be intelligent enough to know that there is
something wrong, and not so intelligent as to be
able to see what it is that is wrong” (1972: 197).
Bateson, like Lidz, focuses on the family as the
context of this learning process. However, the
family is not central to his hypothesis. The
double bind is a learned relational definition and
though family examples are used, they are more
illustrative than restrictive. All of the
criticisms of Lidz apply to Bateson as well. The
double bind is depicted as a ubiquitous
phenomenon. What differentiates the special
reaction of schizophrenia? Neither the problem of
isomorphy nor intercultural variation is touched
on.
From
these two examples, a more general comment can be
made concerning one of the implications of using
-- either explicitly or implicitly -- the concept
‘culture’ and ‘schizophrenia’ in an etiological
construct. In Bateson, one sees a situation in
which the schizophrenic learns autistic responses
in his exposure to culture. In Lidz, the
schizophrenic is seen as not having learned to
operate within culture by from his family
experience. In both cases and virtually all others
I have encountered within the social psychiatric
and psychiatric anthropological tradition, (e.g.,
Opler 1967; Rennie, Srole, Langner, Michael and
Opler 1962; Leighton 1959; Scheff 1966;
Hollingshead and Redlich 1958), one finds a causal
imputation going from culture to the individual
and stopping there rather abruptly. Rennie
elucidates this posture in explicating the
theoretical basis of the Midtown Manhattan Study
in his introduction:
The direction of this causal connection is implied
by the nature of the concepts themselves. Since
schizophrenia is not held to cause culture and a
connection is imputed, culture is seen as the
independent variable in relating the aggregate and
the individual phenomenon.2
Yet culture, classically defined as “that
complex whole which includes knowledge, belief,
art, law, morals, customs, and any other
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a
member of society”, (Tylor 1871: 1) does not
easily lend itself to the interpretation of any
relationship with events on an individual level.
Goodenough’s definition is more useful: “A
society’s culture consists of whatever it is one
has to know in order to operate in a manner
acceptable to its member” (1957: 167) However,
Goodenough’s focus on the individual leaves us
without a term for the knowledge pool held
collectively by the members of a group. The
definition I will be using is similar to
Goodenough’s but focuses attention on the
individual as a member of an information system.
The
dependent variable in this causal imputation is an
even more troublesome concept. In careful use,
schizophrenia is a description of a set of
behaviors. There is no established physiological
component--only the tautology of saying that this
type of behavior is schizophrenia and
schizophrenia is this type of behavior. The Modern
Synopsis of Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry
define schizophrenia as a:
Roland
Fischer observes that “the only facts relevant to
schizophrenia are of a psychological or
sociological nature, for the simple reason that
schizophrenia is disordered social or
psychological behavior” (1972: 84).
Schizophrenia is not a disease in the medical
sense of the term ‘disease’ and its meaning (or
the lack of it) is an oft discussed topic (cf.
Menninger 1970; Cancro 1970; 1972; Kubie 1972;
Patterson and Kaebling 1972). However, as
Altschule observes “the word [schizophrenia], I’m
sorry to say, will probably last forever for two
reasons. One is that it is meaningless and the
other is that it’s euphonious. The combination of
euphony and lack of meaning is unbeatable” (Cancro
1970: 86). The conclusion generally arrived at in
considerations of the meaning of ‘schizophrenia’
is that one is dealing with a syndrome or reaction
pattern.
The
isomorphy of the condition, the fact that the
cluster of symptoms which define schizophrenia can
be produced by many known agents coupled with its
occurrence with unknown etiology cast many of the
genetic and biochemical studies in a rather queer
light (e.g. Slater 1972; Abelin 1972; Hurst 1972;
Karlsson 1972; Heath et al. 1957; Wooley 1962;
Boulton et. al. 1968). The linear causation model
on which such approaches are based is invalidated
by even a cursory knowledge of the clinical
literature. Kety (1967) and Fischer (1972) both
conclude in reviews of the bio-chemical hypotheses
that have been offered that the explanations lack
reliability. Fischer comments that:
The genetic evidence suffers from a similar deficiency. Just as there unquestionably is a bio-chemical component in at least some cases of schizophrenia, there also seems to be a genetic input into the disorder. However, though speculation on whether this input be “monogenic involving intermediateness”, “single-locus recessive”, or a “major partially dominant gene” may provide a valuable exercise for the researcher, the nature of the evidence does not justify such distinctions. In a review of these procrustean efforts at model application, Anderson comments that:
To summarize,
the isomorphy of the schizophrenic syndrome
suggests that anything that defines the requisite
conditions, i.e., establishes a particular state
or context, will determine a ‘schizophreniform’
reaction. The implication is also that whether the
etiology be trypanosomiasis (Opler 1967; Wallace
1972), influenza (Cancro 1970), various types of
drug toxicity, or unknown (which restrictively
defines the medical category) in some way the
responses are connected. In consequence, I will be
concentrating on the reaction itself and the
behavior it engenders in attempting to develop a
model to explain it. It is appropriate at this
point to return to the earlier consideration of
‘culture’, and to redefine the term for the
purpose of this problem.
Rather
than viewing culture as the traditional, rather
static construct of Tylor, or as the individuated
learning concept of Goodenough, I will be using a
concept of an information system in which
individuals actively participate. Behavior in this
context is a result of information and a source of
information both to the individual and to the
group. In any given situation, one is both
determining a response of some kind and
concomitantly reporting the success of past
responses to others through ones present
disposition. The information system is built out
of these experiences and pieces of information
which are reported to one another. Unless the
information flowing back into the system is the
same as what it predicted it would be, one need
not visualize a static, functional model but a
system of articulation which the continuous
“reality test” of individuals attempting to apply
the information.
In
conclusion, the necessarily limited nature of
“mapped” information is a “given”. The process of
responding to “gaps” in the information system and
of developing and using information is critical to
understanding both group and individual behavior
and specifically to appreciating how schizophrenia
fits into the larger picture.
NOTES
1. In considering theories of schizophrenia I have chosen an illustrative rather than an exhaustive approach. Extensive literature reviews and discussion are available in Van Pragg (1976) and Arieti (1974).
2. Again,
as in the discussion of schizophrenia, contrasting
concepts of culture were chosen in lieu of a
review of its many uses in the anthropological
literature (cf. Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952). More
elaborate arguments concerning the utility and
danger of using the concept of culture are
presented by Keesing (1974) and Bennett (1976).