III
THE
PROBLEM WITH PROBLEMS
In summary, human social behavior can be viewed as
the articulation of a subsystem comprising the
individual and the group in which he participates
with the continual change pressed upon them by the
larger system in which they exist. Consequent to
the status of subsystem are
perturbations--problems whose origin is exogenous
to the subsystem--the unforeseen actions of an
unknown reality, the uncontrolled consequences
generated by our own actions touching off events
outside our ken. The key to survival on any level
in the system is prediction which makes effective
articulation possible. The key to prediction is
information--its use, change and increase.
Monitoring the fit between informational map and
real territory implies a complex but descriptively
simple process. Sufficient conservatism must be
maintained in the process as not to risk loss of
information and to make its use as efficient as
possible (one need not examine inconsequential
contradiction). But sufficient flexibility must be
maintained as to make necessary changes not only
possible but to functionally impel them (one
shivers when cold, the reaction to temperature in
excess of the comfortable range is not voluntary).
This situation points to a kind of equilibrium
range which, if exceeded, triggers response. Given
an unrecognized perturbation throwing off
articulation--given a problem--problem-solving
strategy is a necessary response. Schizophrenia
will be presented as a particular status or state
in this problem-solving process. In effect, it is
the way we work (or do not work) in certain
experiential contexts.
Recent findings in neurophysiology research
provide a useful foundation for modeling the
problem-solving process. The various experiments
summarized here give evidence of the
neurophysiology in which such a problem-solving
process must be grounded.
Stanley Schachter (1967) designed an experiment to
measure the relationship between psychological and
physiological hunger in obese and normal subjects.
He found that while the two appeared together in
the normal subjects, the obese subjects seemed to
eat with not connection to their physiological
condition. In another experiment, Schachter
investigated the effect of cognitively blocking
the process of labeling emotion and reports:
The linkage among emotion, cognition, and
situation are non-arbitrary but neither are they
automatic. Verbalized knowledge might be viewed as
a manifestation of the understood parameters
involved in causing an emotion while the emotion
itself is seen as stored, accumulated information
about previous situational relations with the
environment.
The relationship between emotion and cognition and
the mechanisms of information retrieval is
clarified by Kostandov’s (1975) modification of
Chodorkoff’s (1952, 1954) investigation of word
recognition. Kostandov replicated Chodorkoff’s
findings of a differential in the length of time
required to recognize emotionally “loaded” words
and “neutral” words among psychotics. The research
design used a screen on which words could be
flashed for varying lengths of time. Two groups of
words were used. One was related to problems in
the individual’s life history (e.g., “thief”,
“sex”). The other group contained neutral words of
similar length (e.g., “throw”, “car”). The words
were flashed on the screen for increasing lengths
of time. The recognition time was found to vary
such that the “loaded” words took consistently
longer to identify than the neutral words.
Kostandov then separately administered two drugs,
one of which was the phenothiazine,
chlorpromazine, frequently used in the treatment
of schizophrenia. When the two groups of words
were flashed again, it was observed that the
recognition time for the two groups had equalized.
This finding would seem to imply (among other
things) that emotional and cognitive access to
stored information are effectively separable, in
that they apparently operate independently in
influencing the retrieval of information: when
emotion is either blocked or held constant,
recognition time becomes constant. Other
experimental findings support this interpretation
by showing either physiologically or chemically
induced separation of function (Flynn 1967; Paré
1969; Norton 1969; Battig 1969; Brady 1970;
Frankenhaeuser 1974; Sem-Jacobsen and Styri 1975).
Pribram (1967) presents evidence for another
neurophysiological mechanism of information
modification and augmentation. From a rather
complex set of experiments with cats, he concludes
that his data suggests “cerebral control over its
own input” which is expressed in two opposing
tendencies:
Pribram’s
model has another important implication. It
provides a “place” for examining emotional
reactions. A capacity to replicate or model
situations irrespective of present context makes
possible the search of past situations and the
identification of factors assumed to be causal in
them. These causal factors can then be tested
against the present situation.
The utility of such a capacity can be seen as an
analogue to natural selection. Rather than it
being necessary for the species to adapt to
changed conditions genetically (e.g., mosquitoes
dying off until a resistant genetic configuration
is arrived at), change can be based on the
abstraction of the problem, isolation of the
relevant determinants and the development of an
appropriate response. In other words, when a
response does not work, examination gives the
capacity to rewrite the response without rewriting
the genetic structure.
The “structure” of information storage in the
individual which defines the fundamental
characteristics of retrieval and processing (noted
previously) can be visualized as a set of rules
similar in flavor and function to the rewrite
rules in a linguistic grammar operating on a three
dimension matrix array (Chomsky 1965; Wall 1972;
Perlmutter 1971).
In a matrix in which the cells denote the
structured, total potential states of the system,
only a subset of these potential reactions will
obtain at any given point in time.
Emotion
Cognition Figure 1. Hypothetical configuration at Time I
In other
words, if the array is seen as having an on/off
position in each cell, a particular situation will
define a response configuration of activated and
unactivated cells. These matrix arrays “stack on
each other as they occur in time forming a three
dimensional array which will serve as a structural
description of memory. This “data cube” is what is
operated on to identify the patterns in experience
which are emotion and cognition.
Emotion
Experience
Present
Cognition Figure 2. Memory Array
The relationship between emotion and cognition is
a complex one. However, for the purposes of this
model, it can be assumed that each possible
reaction can be viewed as having an emotional
component and a cognitive component. Further, the
position of the reaction in the matrix implies
both the associated emotion and the associated
cognitive response whether it be correctly labeled
or not. The justification for this simplification
is contained in the finding presented above that
emotion and cognition appear to be two of the ways
in which experiences are indexed, recalled and
compared. A preliminary process in orienting for
response to a situation might be seen in comparing
the present configuration with past configurations
seeking essentially identical situations to inform
the selection of a behavioral alternative.
A central characteristic of this matching process
is its predictive, essentially teleological,
function. One outgrowth potential to it, is the
development of rules to inform responses to
particular situations and shortcut the search
routine.
Such a system of rules can be compared to those of
a linguistic grammar. A useful distinction might
be drawn between the concept of a “context free”
and a “context sensitive” grammar. A “context
free” grammar has rules of the form a®b in which a
situation “a” rewrites as “b” irrespective of
contingencies external to “a” which modify the
situation. A behavioral rule parallel to this type
of construct might be, “Thou shalt not kill”.
“Context sensitivity” introduces another index for
particularizing the response to the
characteristics of the situation itself: “Thou
shalt not kill unless thou art in a war at which
time it is okay”. In essence, it implies that more
of the context must be adjudged in order to
predict what is rewritten. A “context-free” rule,
for example, might be in a form like “Thou shalt
walk on the sunny side of the street”. While,
“Walk on the sunny side of the street, unless: (1)
you feel very hot; (2) your skin hurts from
sunburn; (3) it is so cold the sun adds nothing to
the walk; (4) you feel rushed; (5) you are in a
bad mood; (6) you have just received
photosensitizing ‘drops’ from the optometrist”,
might be an example of a context-sensitive rule.
Adding the common theoretical stipulation that
emotions are ranked on some sort of hedonistic
continuum (1 being least and 8 most satisfactory),
and letting X be the cognitive variable and Y the
emotional variable in the coordinate system in
Figure 1, the context-sensitive rule might look
like:
for all XY
rewrites dY
unless
1. XY less
than or equal to g4 g4 rewrites
d2 therefore ~d
2. XY less
than or equal to i3 i3 rewrites
d1 therefore ~d
3. XY less
than or equal to h4 h4 rewrites
d2 therefore ~d
4. XY
equals cY cY rewrites d1
therefore ~d
5. XY less
than or equal to X3 X3 rewrites
d1 therefore ~d
6. XY
equals jY jY rewrites d1
therefore ~d
The general rule says that whatever the emotional
(Y) and cognitive (X) components of the situation,
rewrite X (the unspecified cognitive condition) as
d (the specific rule “Walk in the sun”) unless Y
(the general emotional state) is such that there
is some sort of interaction effect anticipated as
a result of previous experience. In rules 1, 2, 3
and 5 a threshold value is involved (e.g., rule 2
predicts that if you are in a bad mood, whatever
the cognitive component, worrying about walking in
the sun will make you feel worse (an increment of
-2). In rule 4, I decided to call ‘hurry’ a
cognitive state with potential association with a
range of emotional states; however, the state of
hurry controls the response. In rule 6, I decided
to let ‘drops’ define a specific cell with special
response characteristics.
This hypothetical rule for walking in the sun
provides an illustration of the functional
organization of experiences. Except for rule 6
(photosensitizing drops) the rules make no claim
to appreciate the causal determinants of the
predicted reaction, the rules do not explain why
one reacts to walking in the sun as one does, but
rather, these rules organize previous experience
for use in future contingencies by picking an
element out of the situation which effectively
controls the consequences by controlling a block
of possible behavior.
Let me now briefly summarize the points that
material is intended to illustrate before
continuing. The Schachter experiments with hunger
and electroshock show the interpretation of
emotion and cognition to be non-automatic and
confoundable. Similarly, Kostandov’s findings also
suggest that memory has emotional and cognitive
components and that they are separable. Pribram’s
experiment adds a state which is independent of
context--a place to think--by introducing the
concept of cerebral control of input.
Based on these findings, a model of the
organizational characteristics of psychic
functioning was introduced which I shall now
expand. The three-dimensional matrix presented was
defined such that one axis offered the cognitive
indexing of an experience, another the emotional
(non-verbal) indexing, and the third presented a
kind of “pack of cards” effect of these
experiences stored over time and accessible to the
present along the third axis.
This model was then viewed as a way to make
information available for solving problems. A
problem in the present situation defines a search
of previous situations which offer information
useful for its solution. The closer the
characteristics of the previous experience to the
present situation, the greater the amount of
potentially relevant information it offers for
solving the present problem. The separable aspect
of emotional and cognitive indexing presents the
possibility that a search can generate logically
unrelated items. The emotional indexing makes it
possible to jump from emotion to emotion along a
row of the matrix rather than following a
cognitive path or vice versa.
One hospitalized psychiatric patient interviewed,
whom I will call Mr. Ronson, characteristically
jumped from image to image as though they were
linked in this way. For example, he made the
following connection in a response I will consider
later, “My family, couple of Romans, I experienced
the same thing”. Similarly, this duality offers
cognition the potential for ignoring emotional
information, e.g., another subject, whom I will
call Ms. Peters, chose to ignore the fear she
chronically felt and behave as though she were not
experiencing it. Both of these persons will be
discussed more fully below.
Historicity plays a large role in defining the
appreciation of an situation. The more experiences
with a situation, the more referents and the
greater the number of associations, rules and
meanings surrounding it. It is through these
experiences, associations, rules and meanings that
the problem-solving process operates.
If the problem-solver finds a cognitive and
emotional experience comparable to the present
situation, that information is applied. If the
information is not effective and the problem
remains, the search continues. When the
problem-solver finds no comparable total
experience, the process moves into a second
reaction. Assuming that there is no previous
experience in which emotion and cognition appeared
in this particular configuration but that neither
emotion nor cognition is novel (i.e., that they
have both occurred previously in some other
configuration), the solution may involve the
creative recombination of extant elements in a new
way. For example, Ms. Peters, in learning to
ignore her fear could be said to have redefined
the cognitive interpretation of her experience.
Mr. Ronson exhibited an even more “creative”
recombination which will lead to the next stage.
During the period I interviewed Mr. Ronson, North
Carolina experienced a fairly extended drought.
Mr. Ronson was allowed to visit his family one
weekend. He had made a bet with his son and had
lost. He was paying his son when the first drops
of rain fell. He commented that he “paid for the
rain all across the state”. Here, I suspect that
what Mr. Ronson was experiencing reflects a third
possibility.
The third reaction is generated when either
cognition or emotion or both are novel. In this
situation, the problem solver “holds constant” the
identified element (if any) in an attempt to find
an explanation for its appearance with the novel
element. For example, Mr. Ronson held the
situation of the rain and paying his son constant
and attempted to explain the emotion he felt by
claiming responsibility for the rain.
There are, however, two potentialities for
responding to novel experiences. In some cases,
though the problem-solver does not have the
knowledge himself, it is available through the
information system by asking people, watching
television, going to the doctor, etc. In essence,
it is a question of finding a meaningful label.
In others, as perhaps in Mr. Ronson’s experience,
such a label may not exist. Consequently, though
the search for a solution to the problem
continues, the success of the search is not
guaranteed.
When a resolution is found a search boundary
occurs. This boundary may imply a solution or
simply that the problem loses its moment. A search
boundary can be described as a return to the real
context. The importance of such occasions of
“reality testing” is obvious. One might think of
“reality testing” as focusing outward
(“participation” in Pribram’s terminology) as
contrasted with the narrow beam inward focusing
(“preparation”) of problem-solving. It involves
the revision of the map used at the base situation
(that at the time the problem was identified) to
conform to the real present situation.
What discriminates the schizophrenic experience
from normal experience? How might the search
process be involved? What sort of reactions does a
search contain that could contribute to the
distinction?
In problem-solving theory a “search” is composed
of episodes. An episode is defined as:
One might describe a problem as an alarm triggered
by a perturbation. The problem-solving search is
an attempt to solve the problem and turn of the
alarm. A distinction must be made between the
particular ‘episodes’ and what Newell and Simon
call the ‘problem-solving event’, which I will
simply call the ‘search’. a search is made up of
one or more episodes. The search may consist of
one try (episode) if the right tactic is chosen
the first time. Or the tactic may not solve the
problem, in which case an episode boundary occurs
and the problem-solver returns to the original
problem situation (Newell and Simon’s base
situation) to try another approach. When an
approach is successful, the problem is solved and
a search boundary occurs.
This process is elaborated in slightly different
terms by Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960) as
summarized by Schoepfle, Topper and Fisher:
Both of these problem-solving models provide a
structure for considering a deceptively obvious
issue: What does a ‘search’ do? It solves a
problem and frees the problem-solver’s attention.
The models predict that when the problem-solver
succeeds he returns to the real situation. The
real situation becomes the focus of the present
perceptual context (what the individual
apprehends) without the distortion, selective
in-attention, and occlusion attendant to the
narrow, high focus of problem-solving.
However, in the discussion of TOTE, performing the
operation and imagining performing the operation
are equated. In most instances this equation is
valid and one sees the ‘alarm’ turned off either
by actively solving the problem or by knowing how
and imagining its solution.
In schizophrenia, one encounters (as perhaps in
Mr. Ronson’s example above) a third alternative
wherein the individual can turn off the alarm
without knowing how to solve the problem. In
effect, the problem remains and the search
continues when next the problem appears and
another attempt is made to apply the imaginary
resolution to the real situation..
But sometimes individuals encounter problems which
their problem-solving routines do not solve and
yet the problems seemingly continue to demand
resolution. It is in this situation that the
‘real’ search boundaries are lost along with the
revision function which normally occurs at such
boundaries. It is also at this juncture that
imaginary solutions are likely to enter full
blown. The loss of these boundaries attenuates
contact with the real situation such that the
continuing search adheres to and distorts the
perception of reality. An example of some of the
possible consequences of an ‘unbounded’ search is
afforded by Mr. Ronson who was interviewed in a
local psychiatric hospital. Perhaps a more
complete introduction to Mr. Ronson would be
appropriate at this time.
Mr. Ronson is a 40-year-old, white, southern male.
He is a large, powerful-looking man raised on a
farm in eastern North Carolina. Mr. Ronson was
brought up a Methodist and religion plays a large
role in his thinking. He is married and has two
sons who are 14 and 16. Mr. Ronson had been a
social studies teacher in junior high school
before developing schizophrenia. He is
intelligent, well educated and occasionally (as
will be seen) quite articulate. Mr. Ronson has
been in and out of hospitals for over ten years.
His illness follows the classic symptomatology of
schizophrenia with a heavy salting of the patterns
and compulsions associated with paranoia. However,
the purpose of this section is not to present a
clinical picture but to offer a position
contrasting to the orthodox from which to
interpret this material. Mr. Ronson made the
following statements during the two interviews
with him.
This atemporality is a dominant theme occurring in Mr. Ronson’s interviews and, obviously, a conscious concern. He is isolated from the reality in which time has meaning among the static memories which are the domain of the search [It must be noted that this feeling of atemporality was probably supported by the ward environment (cf. Rosenhan: 1973)].
This isolation permeates Mr. Ronson’s world view. Rather than progressing, he stands still as the world around him changes. He too wishes to go on but it is not clear to him how to go on or why he cannot. Death comes into may of his statements and perhaps becomes a symbol of both escape and going on. At the same time, Mr. Ronson also seems to identify a great deal with Christ.
An interesting contrast to Mr. Ronson is evident
in Ms. Peters whom I interviewed in another local
hospital. Ms. Peters’ experience was one of
powerful and apparently acontextual fear. She was
plagued by voices one of whom she identified as
the devil. Intermittently, she was wracked by
spasms of fear and guilt. This presented her with
some unusual problems. In Ms. Peters’ situation,
the feeling of threat becomes generalized because
if one accepts the ‘normal’ notion that fear is a
response to threat, then it follows
incontrovertibly that everything is threatening
because the fear appears in all situations. The
problem then becomes the discovery of the reason
for the fear and its resolution.
However, rather than taking this ‘strategy’, Ms.
Peters ‘chose’ to accept but ignore the fear while
attempting to find a way to control it.
Consequently, she ingested the fear into her
personality by redefining the interpretation of
origin from exogenous to endogenous. Essentially,
she came to deny the normal interpretation of fear
and substituted the idea that her fear was somehow
unreal. She attempted to ignore the fear when it
arose and developed various behaviors which would
prevent its activation, e.g., she constantly had a
radio or record player on to drown out the voices.
By denying the reality of the fear and learning to
ignore and avoid its expression, she managed to
remain lucid, rational and, for the most part,
behaviorally normal. Consequently, though much of
her experience was outside the normal she remained
fluent and relatively functional in it.
What differentiates Mr. Ronson’s reaction from Ms.
Peters’ or, more generally, why does he seem to be
‘more schizophrenic’ than she? In attempting to
answer this question, it helps to focus on the
nature or history of the ‘uncommon’ experiences.
There are four variables which are important
indicators: first, chronicity--how long has the
person experienced their expression; second,
frequency--has their occurrence been continuous or
intermittent; third, amplitude--how attention
engaging or powerful are these experiences;
fourth, distance--how ‘far’ are they from the
common range, i.e., how bizarre and unusual are
they.
In this comparison, Mr. Ronson’s condition was
apparently attended by greater chronicity and
frequency while amplitude and distance are harder
to judge in this particular instance. Chronicity
is the most obvious difference. Mr. Ronson had
been in and out of hospitals for ten years. Ms.
Peters had been in the hospital for less than a
year. Frequency is also fairly easy to
distinguish. Ms. Peters’ condition seems subject
to periods of remission which Mr. Ronson does not
enjoy. Distance and amplitude are more difficult
to determine if only because Mr. Ronson has come
to operate almost exclusively from the frame of
his shifted range and consequently his
verbalizations are to some extent specific to that
experience and seem correspondingly unusual.
These latter two variables are more useful in
extremely acute reactions where the shift in frame
is rapid, severe and can be accompanied by
symptoms rather like those of Mr. Ronson (cf. J.D
Frank’s experiments on association change in drug
reactions 1968, 1972, 1974). The difficulty in
interpreting these two variables in this case is
inherent in the shift in bias or attention which
Mr. Ronson observes himself--”Well, somehow or
other, I think I’ve been stretched to the point
here that my equilibrium or my ego or my id or my
superego has been overturned”. The critical
difference between Mr. Ronson and Ms. Peters seems
to be that the conditions he has experienced have
forced active participation in his reactions while
those she has experienced have not.
The shift in focus is not a voluntary decision. It
is--for the most part--a processual reaction based
on maintaining maximum flexibility in the system.
One is where the information and the experience
are. It may be that Mr. Ronson started his
‘illness’ with a response similar to Ms. Peters’;
or, the onset may have been sufficiently acute as
to make this impossible. However, it would seem
that over the years, Mr. Ronson’s problem-solving
response has found a combination of concepts
which, if put together, resolves the problem (a
sort of ‘present’ + ‘family’ + ‘death’ +
‘everybody’ equation). This equation gets worked
though a great number of variations during the
course of the interview. It may be that the
process is attempting to find a combination which
would change this internal resolution to an
applied solution.
As the length of the search increases, the
problem-solver uses more and more unusual search
strategies (the common ones not having worked) and
starts trying unusual tactics and combinations of
information. The following was presented by Mr.
Ronson with ‘machine-gun’ rapidity in response to
a question about an experience he had been having.
The sense of being driven or pushed from idea to
idea encountered in Mr. Ronson seems to be a
consequence of a lack of predictive comprehension.
The situation does not allow use of the time and
energy conserving rules and pre-packaged analyses
described above. The self expects to react in a
predicted way but finds it does not react as
anticipated. Each situation demands a complete
re-analysis in order to try to get a grasp on
what’s going on. The carry-over of information
from situation to situation is systematically
reduced as the lack of predictive power of
previous interpretations is exposed.
In essence, the problem-solver is limited to a
very busy appreciation of the surface of the
moment. He does not have the time or the
predictive control required to establish the
layered conscious purposes drawn from previous
experiences of the normally functioning ‘self’. In
fact, the images jumped on often seem to have more
historicity, power, depth and ‘personality’ than
the surface self participating in the actual
situation.
The reader may have noticed that the equation
mentioned above (‘present’ + ‘family’ + ‘death’ +
‘everybody’) is visible in examples 2, 4 and 5
above. Every time Mr. Ronson describes his own
present situation in the interview (e.g., “I’ve
been here the whole month of June), and episode
follows which ends in a more general attribution
(my wife and children and all are getting old too)
along with some connection with death (a lot of
people are passing out of here).
I suspect that the unknowing repetition of this
episode implies that while it may resolve the
problem that impels it, the episode is not a real
solution. However, the imaginary solution does
apparently provide a kind of closure which allows
him to shift his attention to other concerns.
One can also see the episode as a response to the
isolation Mr. Ronson must feel when he describes
himself as going backward, being shot through with
X rays, etc. Also, he apparently attempts to
ground himself in the common range of experience
as he chooses examples and images with which he is
familiar and which he seemingly feels will be
familiar to others. He most often chooses real
examples but when he cannot find a real example,
he approximates the affect involved by putting
images together (“my family, couple of Romans, I
experienced the same thing”).
These affect approximations make it possible for
the dimensions and the ‘feel’ of a problem to be
communicated before the problem itself is
cognitively identified. By doing so, the
problem-solver may enhance the probability that he
will receive useful information from others.
Hopefully, such information will then aid in the
next attempt to cognitively formulate the feeling
which is the problem and find a way to cope with
both the problem and the uncontrolled
problem-solving mechanisms which the problem set
off.
In conclusion, these examples and discussions of
temporal isolation, episodes, searches, the
predictive self, driven response and affect
approximation are intended to highlight aspects of
the problem-solving process. This process, when
activated, can either solve the problem that
triggered it or become a problem itself.
Schizophrenia is a reaction characteristic of this
latter situation in Western society and in groups
using the information system Western society has
built up. It may be that a group which carries
more accurate information concerning this
process--what to expect and how to react--would
effectively obviate some of the problems with
problems.